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Our world is replete with narratives—narratives of our making that
are uniquely appreciated by us. This can hardly be denied,
certainly if by ‘narratives’ we have in mind only those of the purely
discursive variety—i.e. those complex representations that relate
and describe the course of some unique series of events, however
humble, in a coherent but selective arrangement.1 Our capacity to
create, enjoy and benefit from narratives so defined—be they
factual or fictive—surely sets us apart from other creatures. Some,
impressed by the prominence of this phenomenon in the traffic of
human life, have been tempted to deploy that famous Aristotelian
formula, holding that we are, inter alia, not just social or rational or
political animals but that we are also rightly distinguished as
narrative or story-telling animals.
This observation peaks philosophical interest in diverse ways. We
might wonder: what, if anything, are the identifying features of
narratives? What is the basis of our unique narrative capacities?
Which cognitive and imaginative capacities enable us to produce
and appreciate them? What roles or functions might narratives play
in our lives? Although not exclusively, most of the papers collected
1 This emphasis on the essentially discursive nature of narratives is
consonant with a number of working definitions that have proposed to
help us better understand the notion. See for example: G. Prince,
Narratology: The Form and Functioning of Narrative (The Hague:
Mouton, 1982), 4; J. Bruner, Acts of Meaning (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1990), 43; P. Lamarque and S. Olsen, Truth, Fiction and
Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 225; N. Carroll,
Beyond Aesthetics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 126.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is no agreed definition or criterion for
sharply identifying narratives—and certainly none couched in terms of
necessary and sufficient conditions. If it is thought that this is a serious
concern about the philosophical usefulness of the notion then it must also
be noted that we are no worse off in this regard than when we make free
use of notions of such ‘knowledge’ or ‘causation’ (at least, as things stand).
It seems we have little choice but to work with our pre-theoretic,
unanalysed—ordinary—understanding of narratives. We can make clear
enough what we mean by means of examples, if need be.
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in this volume touch on this last question in one way or another
(even if only by adopting a sceptical tone that urges caution about
our expectations in this regard). The fact is that claims about what
narratives ‘do for us’ range from the modest to the downright
remarkable. The nine original contributions contained in this
anthology divide into two types: those which clarify or warn against
existing claims that have been made about the importance of
narratives in our lives and those which advance new proposals on
this topic. The first three papers fall into the latter category—
advancing, in turn, distinct claims that narratives are implicated in,
if not essential for: (a) enabling us to exercise our imaginations in
unique ways; (b) developing our everyday understanding of actions
performed for reasons; and (c) external reflection, evaluation and
orientation in our understanding of the situations of ourselves and
others.
In ‘Framing Narratives’, Gregory Currie considers how our
engagements with fictional narratives—complex representational
artefacts—allow us to exercise our imaginations, extending them to
novel topics and in novel ways. He advances the view that apart
from grasping an author’s communicative intentions about the
represented storied events, an important part of engaging with
narratives involves the adoption of ‘frameworks’, for readers or
listeners not only note what happens in stories, they are also
‘encouraged to adopt a way of engaging imaginatively with those
events’ (Currie, this volume). This is quite distinct from the kind of
imaginative demands required to apprehend a story’s content—as
detailed by its plot or fabula. Adopting a framework is instead to
adopt a kind of attitudinal and emotional stance—in effect, it is to
don a ‘new persona’ at the invitation of the narrative itself and the
way it is constructed. Whether or not the invitation is issued by the
author, it is our ability to engage with narratives in this sort of way
that is responsible for their enabling us to see things in new ways
(and not just to imagine new things).
Currie maintains that, so understood, the ‘motives and mecha-
nisms’ that drive framework adoption are equally at work in other
visceral and imaginative engagements; for example those that
characterise joint attentional encounters. In both cases, subpersonal
mechanisms for imitative and emotional responding are brought to
bear.2 Thus, even though consumers of narratives are not always in
2 For this reason, he denies that the process is best understood in
terms of developing a ‘theory’ (even if a not very explicit one) about the
persona embedded in narrative.
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the company of real others, both activities involve emotional and
imaginative positionings. Often one harmoniously resonates with—
even comes to identify with—another during joint attention. And
the same can hold true of the way we engage with a given narrative.
The important difference is that in the latter case even if one is not
responding to another living human being one is still resonating
with a personality (and never merely with a text), though the
personality might not be that of the author. Importantly, we need
not always identify with personas on offer; we can also react against
or resist them. And this fact, Currie argues, sheds light on the
problem of imaginative resistance, which is experienced when one
is repelled by certain narratives. By distinguishing a narrative
content from its framework, Currie offers a bifurcated account of
the different kinds of imaginative abilities that must be employed
when it comes to understanding and appreciating narratives. As a
result, we can distinguish two importantly different varieties of
imaginative dissonance that occur when we attempt to engage with
some narratives—one being more intellectual than the other.
In his paper ‘The Narrative Practice Hypothesis’, Hutto
identifies a quite different role that narratives might play in our
lives—that of enabling us to use and develop our characteristic
ability to make sense of intentional action as being performed for a
reason. His proposal consists of two novel, complementary claims.
The first is that our everyday understanding of intentional action is
itself an essentially narrative practice—i.e. that ‘folk psychological’
understanding always takes the form of constructing narratives.
The second is that children acquire the relevant interpretative skills
for achieving this through repeated encounters with specific kinds
of narratives, when they are appropriately supported by others.
This is the normal route through which we become familiar with
both the core principles of folk psychology and the norm-governed
possibilities for wielding it in practice, i.e. knowing how and when
to use it.
This goes against the received view that our everyday folk
psychological abilities are a special kind of native cognitive
endowment; one gifted to us by our evolutionary forefathers.
Rather than supposing that this capacity depends upon or
presupposes inherited ‘theory of mind’ abilities, Hutto argues, in
contrast, that we each normally acquire a skilled understanding of
basic folk psychology for the first time in ontogeny by engaging
with narratives with a special subject matter—i.e. those which are
about protagonists who act for reasons. In this, children must have
the appropriate support of their carers, with whom these narratives,
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understood as complex representations, are objects of joint
attention. Emphasizing this last point, Hutto takes a leaf out of
Sellars’ book and underlines the essentially intersubjective, socially
scaffolded basis of our capacity to understand ourselves and others
as those who act for reasons.
In ‘Dramatic Irony, Narrative and the External Perspective’
Peter Goldie emphasizes the important role that narratives play in
enabling us to take up third-personal, but not impersonal,
perspectives on the situations of others. This, he holds, is necessary
if we are to engage with them properly. He contrasts this activity
with that of perspective shifting of the sort in which one either
imagines being in the shoes of the other or imagines being the
other, taking on the relevant traits and dispositions oneself. On the
supposition that in most cases we already have a reasonable grasp of
the thoughts and feelings of others, Goldie’s focus is on the
question of ‘how are we best to use the psychological resources at
our disposal, including our imagination, to engage with these
thoughts and feelings’ (Goldie, this volume). In this context,
echoing certain well-known criticisms of simulation theory, he
worries that ‘perspective shifting’ accounts run the risk of leading
us to over-identify with the other in ways that prevent or make it
impossible to achieve an adequate appraisal or evaluation of their
situation. Only in standing back, in grasping the wider details of
the other’s story—by appreciating dramatic ironies that are only
visible from a distant, external stance—are we able to make the
appropriate assessments.
Goldie’s conclusion lends support to the popular idea that
self-narratives are crucial vehicles for reflecting upon our lives and
actions—that they make possible certain prominent kinds of our
ethical and personal development. For example, autobiographical
snippets, whether issued as remembrances of self-dialogue or in the
natural course of conversing with others, serve as objects of
reflection and review.3 This sort of activity provides the fodder for
steering and leading our lives in ways that other, less articulate
creatures simply cannot.
3 Autobiographical self-narratives, however short, reveal more than
just the ‘facts’ about our situations (to the extent that they succeed even in
that); their content and composition also reveals something about their
authors—about their character and concerns. Something shows through in
what one chooses to highlight about oneself and how this is done. It may
be that these expressions are importantly influenced by our wider vision of
ourselves. Bruner and Kalmar have explored this thought, framing it in
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As such, ‘the narratives we weave about our lives can profoundly
affect how we respond to our past and how we lead our lives in the
future’.4 Only creatures capable of this kind of articulate
self-scrutiny can make choices based on the higher-order reflection
of first-order desires and tendencies.5 Personal development based
on such self-examination is neither thought to be straightforward
nor easy, especially since what one is aiming at is not clearly defined
in advance. In this respect it contrasts with the way we prosecute
our more finite projects and it is for this reason that it has been
frequently likened to embarking on a kind of medieval quest.6 It
goes without saying that if narratives did play any or all of these
important roles, they would be phenomena of great philosophical
significance.
Even so, these claims are comparatively modest. For some have
taken a further step, holding that narrative activity is not only
crucially important to human being in the sort of ways outlined
above—they claim it is its very core. This view is enshrined in the
idea that narratives are not just uniquely human creations of special
importance but, as persons, we each and every one of us, are the
unique creations of a special sort of narrative activity! Human
selves just are narrative constructions. So seriously is that idea
the following way: “Typically, we tell ourselves about our own Self and
about other Selves in the form of a story. These stories, however, seem to
fall into narrative genres. Is this only a convention, or is it a necessary
condition of self-telling?” (J. Bruner and D. A. Kalmar, ‘Narrative and
Metanarrative in the Construction of Self’, Self-awareness: Its Nature and
Development, M. Ferrari and R. J. Sternberg (eds.) (New York: Guilford,
1988), 308–331, 318). However, when we answer that question it seems
clear that narrative expressions are a unique way of manifesting ourselves.
4 P. Goldie, On Personality (London: Routledge, 2004), 117.
5 For Taylor this equates to making ‘strong evaluations’, i.e.
comparative judgements about our first-order desires, inclinations and
choices. In doing this, he too holds that it is necessary to make use of an
independent standard—one that we ought to acknowledge. C. Taylor,
Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 4.
6 See ibid., p. 48; A. MacIntyre, After Virtue (London: Duckworth,
1984), 219.
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entertained by some that it has even been proposed that ‘we as a
species might be appropriately named Homo narrans rather than
Homo sapiens’.7
At first blush, such a re-designation and the claim about our
nature upon which it is based may appear extravagant. Yet it would
be difficult to overestimate the seductive attraction it holds for
popular and scientific imaginations. I was reminded of this while
taking a break from preparing this very introduction. I embarked
on an expedition to the Science Museum in London in order to
fulfil a promise to my eldest son, only to happen upon an exhibition
entitled ‘100 years of psychology in Britain’. Serendipitously, there
we saw the following words:
Telling Stories
Once upon a time, it was believed that stories merely recorded
what happened in the world. But some modern psychologists
have come to regard stories as having almost supernatural power.
What we call ‘human nature’ is now thought by some to be
created by language, by conversations, narratives, folk-tales,
songs and poetry. We literally talk ourselves into existence.
This is headline grabbing stuff. If we take it seriously, the very idea
naturally invites a host of questions. For example, we might
wonder: How can we be the products of acts of narration, if in
some sense we are responsible for the production of the relevant
self-making narratives? This is an especially pressing question since
proponents of the narrative self-constitution view are typically
loathe to recognise the existence of narrative-transcendent selves—
the kinds of selves that might play this logical role, acting as
narrators. Instead, they have tended to attempt to make sense of
the idea that human beings develop their ability to weave
self-narratives slowly, over time. Additionally, it is often supposed
that this process of development is socially mediated and
scaffolded.8 Through discrete stages human children gradually
7 R. A. Neimeyer, ‘Community and Coherence: Narrative Contribu-
tions to the Psychology of Conflict and Loss’, Narrative and Conscious-
ness: Literature, Psychology and the Brain, G. D. Fireman, T. E. McVay,
and O. J. Flanagan (eds.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 167.
8 For example, a major part of the notion I have of ‘myself’—that is as
a person exhibiting certain characteristics and fulfilling certain roles—is
parasitic on my grasp of the canonical forms provided by my society. For
example, the characters we encounter, both real and fictional, serve as
models for my own self-understanding. Developmentally speaking, one
Daniel D. Hutto
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learn to form explicit self-narratives. Allegedly this enables them,
not merely to describe and express themselves in new ways, but to
become selves in the first place. These selves, as we know, become
increasingly more elaborate and complex over time.
As a result, certainly in the early stages, ‘we (unlike professional
human storytellers) do not consciously and deliberately figure out
what narratives to tell and how to tell them. Our tales are spun, but
for the most part we don’t spin them: they spin us’.9 Accordingly, it
is a mistake to think of your storyteller—the ‘I’—as a self that
exists independently, over and above the narratives that might be
told about it. This is in line with the fact that it seems that the only
way to characterise any such ‘self’—the only way of giving it any
substance—is to supply some sort of narrative or other about it.10
Reasoning of this sort is predicated upon the strong claim that
‘our interpretation of ourselves is constitutive of what we are’.11
The fashioning of any self worthy of the name is the outcome of a
peculiar kind of hermeneutic activity. Consequently, personhood is
not an automatic birthright of all human beings—and it looks like it
may be forever denied to other species of animal. Schechtman
makes explicit this consequence of the strong reading of the
learns to take up a ‘story-telling’ stance towards one’s own actions just the
way one learns to do so towards the actions of others.
9 D. C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (New York: Penguin Books,
1991), 418.
10 Any substantive answer to the question ‘Who am I?’ requires an act
of narrative self-expression (O. Flanagan, Self Expressions: Mind, Morals
and the Meaning of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). Here we
need more than a logical placeholder—a philosopher’s ‘I’. What we are
after is a full-fledged ‘me’. Being a ‘me’ requires having a persona (at least
one!) that is tied to certain actions, reasons, projects, goals, and choices,
which are only understood by looking both to the person’s past and future.
To be interested in this is to be concerned with the characterisation
problem of personal identity and opposed to its more famous cousin the
re-identification problem (the two are often confused or conflated, to no
good effect).
11 C. Taylor, ‘Self-Interpreting Animals’, Human Agency and
Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 47.
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narrative self-constitution view: ‘Some, but not all, individuals
weave stories of their lives, and it is their doing so that makes them
persons’.12
This idea about what it is to be a person is frequently combined
with the claim that this self-constituting narrative activity is
necessary for ethical flourishing; i.e. it is the basis for the
development of selves of the morally significant kind. Our
self-narratives, it is held by some, are the means by which we
navigate in moral space, orienting towards the good. It is usual that
the scope of this activity is thought to be writ large: ‘In many
narratives the self seeks its identity on the scale of an entire life’.13
Or, as Taylor famously remarks, ‘as I project my life forward and
endorse the existing direction and give it a new one, I project a
future story, not just a state of the momentary future but a bent for
my whole life to come’.14
These are very bold claims about the role and importance of
narratives in our lives, and they invite philosophical critique. In his
important piece ‘Against Narrativity’ Galen Strawson raised some
serious challenges for those who assume that because some people
have narrativizing tendencies when thinking about their lives, all do
(a descriptive claim about human psychology). He also denounced
as pernicious the (normative) claim that one must exhibit narrative
tendencies in order to be truly ethical or lead a flourishing human
life, defending instead the idea that there exists a range of
possibilities for temporal self-experience. In this world, he claims,
there are Episodics, Diachronics, non-Narratives and Narratives—
each of whom enjoys distinct modes of self-experience. As the
labels imply, only members of the latter class necessarily exhibit
narrativizing tendencies of a non-trivial kind. If this is right, the
narrativity thesis is false as an unrestricted claim about the
character of human self-consciousness; not everyone tends to
experience or live or see his or her life in a storied way. But more
than this, Strawson has argued that none of these types can lay
claim to ethical superiority.
12 M. Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1996), 94. The clear implication is that those unable to
tell stories about themselves—those who cannot self-interpret, although
immune from self-deception, buy this at the cost of being cut off from the
possibility of self-knowledge and ethical development.
13 P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
1992), 114–115.
14 Ibid, p. 48.
Daniel D. Hutto
8
Recapitulating and extending the latter critique in his contribu-
tion to this volume, ‘Episodic Ethics’, Strawson devotes himself to
the task of undermining the claim that seeing one’s life in narrative
terms is an essential requirement of genuine human flourishing or
moral being. His strategy is to demonstrate the falsity of this idea
by establishing that living or experiencing life in an Episodic
fashion—in which one does not regard one’s self as something that
persists in such a way that it was there in the (further) past and will
be there in the (further) future—in no way impairs one’s capacity to
live an ethically and emotionally rich life. Consideration is given to
the capacity of Episodics to experience negative moral emotions
such as remorse, contrition, regret and guilt. These topics receive
separate discussions in the essay.15 Crucially, it is argued that
having the morally relevant occurrent emotions and dispositions
does not depend essentially on any particular mode of self-
understanding or relating. We can be sure of this, he suggests,
because the psychological mechanisms that inculcate and sustain
moral behaviour—such as those of conscience and responsibility—
are much more ancient than the Diachronic (let alone Narrative)
modes of self-experience. On this point Strawson defends what he
calls the Emotional Priority Thesis, in an attempt to ensure that the
dependencies are understood the right way around. As a result, the
content of moral experience and the focus of moral rebuke or praise
should always be one’s present dispositions—one’s currently
existing ethical virtues and vices. Accordingly we are told that, ‘the
heart of moral responsibility considered as psychological phenom-
enon is just a sort of instinctive responsiveness to things [and as
such]... Moral responsibility in this fundamental sense is non-
historical’ (Strawson, this volume). The paper concludes by
considering whether there are any other morally relevant traits—
such as loyalty, gratitude, vengefulness, etc.—that are beyond the
reach of Episodics. The verdict is that while certain temporal
temperaments may be associated with certain traits more than
others, nothing logically bars non-Narratives from exhibiting them
in their own way—thus nothing prevents them from leading fully
ethical lives.
Striking a similarly critical tone, Peter Lamarque emphasizes the
important differences between literary narratives and those we find
in the dialogues and conversations of everyday life. Against the
popular narrativist trend, he warns of the serious dangers of
15 For example, it is argued that guilt ‘adds nothing to moral being’
and that ‘it is to be sure a chimpanzee thing’ (this volume).
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transposing (or more precisely, imposing) the former onto the
latter; the risk of ‘aesheticizing if not fictionalizing, real lives’. This
happens, for example, when direct comparisons are made between a
reader’s life and that of some specific literary character or episode
from literature. Such attempts operate on the supposition that art
can—in important and illuminating ways—‘hold up a mirror to
life.’ They are witnessed in the tendency to use literary examples as
bases for influencing the direction of one’s life or to inform
activities of self-understanding and self-creation. Lamarque finds
this especially worrisome. He maintains that any attempt to model
our lives on those of literary figures is ill-founded because the
degree of fit between the two is so poor. Such endeavours either
involve taking over too much from art to life in a potentially
dangerous way or, worse still, they promote a diminished
understanding of what makes great literature great, i.e. by ignoring
its unique qualities. Any successful attempt to treat literary
characters as friends or as guiding exemplars would require us to
bracket all of their specifically ‘literary’ properties.
In making this case, Lamarque cites five important principles
that detail the precise ways in which literature is special. For
example, we are reminded, inter alia, that the very existence of
literary characters is entirely description-dependent; that their
nature is determined by their being elements in a larger artistic
canvas; and that every detail of a literary work admits of questions
concerning its aesthetic significance with respect to the whole. In
line with this, it is observed that the kind of explanation that is
appropriate for making sense of literary actions and events differs
sharply from the causal and rational varieties used in everyday life.
Together these reflections underline a true gap between real-life
and literary narratives. As a consequence it is concluded that
insofar as accounts of narrative identity or self-constitution rely on
making serious comparisons with literary characters or works, they
are shown to be absurd and untenable.
In ‘Reasons to be Fearful’, Kathy Behrendt focuses on a
topic—death—which she argues poses special challenges for both
the Episodic view of the self promoted by Strawson and those
narrativist accounts which model lives too directly on stories (i.e.
those that, like conventional works of literature, have ‘beginnings,
middles and ends’). Strawson, as noted above, is of the view that
there are many selves. Although they exist for variable duration,
these are short-lived entities as compared with the human beings to
whom they bear a special relation. This feature of Strawson’s
account is used to raise worries about the rational basis of his
Daniel D. Hutto
10
fearing death despite the fact that his self-experience is of the
Episodic sort. The tension, Behrendt claims, is that he recognizes
that his death must come after any future events in his life—i.e. it is
an event which he, qua this present mental entity, will not undergo.
Nevertheless, he holds that the threat of an infinitude of
non-existence posed by death reasonably carries emotional import
for him. Behrendt objects to this explanation on several grounds;
her chief complaint is that if falls foul of the ‘temporal fallacy’ in
that it wrongly treats death as an ‘eternal state of affairs’—one that
is directly comparable to what goes on in life. Moreover, Strawson’s
official reason for fearing death would give him equal reason to fear
the infinity of non-existence that preceded his birth, by parity of
reasoning. Consequently, she concludes, although it may be a fact
that Strawson fears his death, there is no reason to do so in light of
his episodic experiential tendencies. An illuminating comparison is
then made between Strawson’s anti-narrative views and traditional
Epicurean offerings; both are ultimately regarded as debarring
rational accommodation of this fear.
Even so, such a-rationalism may be superior to narrativist
attempts to deal with this topic. For those who see lives in storied
terms tend to think that we should not treat death per se as bad or
regrettable, only premature death—i.e. the sort which interrupts a
life before it has reached its ‘proper’ conclusion. But, Behrendt
claims, this simply isn’t the normal attitude that people—even those
with narrativist tendencies—routinely take towards their own
impending death. Moreover, she holds that it is not an attitude they
can adopt unproblematically. For, to do so is to foreclose on life’s
possibilities in a restrictive and artificial way, and one which is at
odds with the narrativist commitment to a view of life as fraught
with possibilities and projecting towards a future. Also, once again,
to hold this sort of view is to mistakenly treat death as ‘an event in
life’—as the concluding moment of each of our life-stories. Apart
from misunderstanding the nature of death, this is problematic for
the narrativist for other reasons too; for one’s death is surely not an
event that one can weave into a self-constituting narrative.
Behrendt recognizes that some philosophers only seek to endorse
the weaker view that narratives play a central role in shaping our
lives without claiming that we in fact think of our lives in storied
terms (or should do so). Yet she offers reasons for thinking that this
softer rendering of the narrative account ‘risks becoming a conceit’.
In sum, it is concluded that our attitude towards death resists
rational treatment by those with narrative and non-narrative
tendencies alike.
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In the light of these criticisms, it seems desirable for those
attracted to the narrative self-constitution view to seek to develop
its more modest variants. One need not defend the view that the
relevant narrative activity necessarily involves having an encom-
passing vision or story of one’s life as a whole or that the narratives
in question must be modelled on those of literature. For example,
the self-narratives in question may be shorter than the shortest
short story. In responding to MacIntyre on this very point, Cooper
once convincingly argued that reason-giving explanations are in
effect ‘little narratives’, designed to make our actions intelligible
occasion by occasion. And, as he insisted, it ‘would be illegitimate
to extrapolate from the existence of these little narratives to a grand
narrative of a life-as-a-whole’.16 Others have recognised this too:
‘Like plans, these narratives can be ‘larger’ or ‘smaller’, structured
hierarchically, from a narrative about a whole life, right down the
‘mini-narrative’ that you might tell of this morning you got up, got
dressed and had breakfast’.17 This seems to highlight an important
difference in the roles that shorter self-narratives and those of the
meta-variety might play. This suggests a more modest rendering of
the narrative self-constitution thesis: perhaps selves need not
always be built from knitting together a series of mini-narratives in
order to form an ‘omnibus’ edition. Indeed, for some, this latter
activity may simply be impossible for various reasons.18
Obviously, what one says on this score matters to the content and
assessment of the narrative self-constitution view. For example, it
was noted above that Galen Strawson argues fiercely against the
truth of the psychological narrativity thesis, descriptively con-
strued. He holds that it is false in any non-trivial sense. But,
crucially, he fashions his criterion of triviality with direct reference
to Taylor. Thus Strawson allows that many everyday activities—his
own example is that of coffee-making—might involve past
appraisal and future planning of a quite limited scope—and to this
extent he allows that they might be said to involve narration in an
uninteresting sense.19 Yet, it is arguable that, far from being trivial,
these narratives ought to be at the centre of our attention in
16 D. Cooper, ‘Life and Narrative’, International Journal of Moral and
Social Studies 3, 1988, 161–172, 165.
17 P. Goldie, op. cit. note 4, 116.
18 Bruner and Kalmar focus on what ‘impels and deters’ from
production of such meta-narratives, op. cit. note 4.
19 See G. Strawson, ‘Against Narrativity’, Ratio 17 (2004), 428–542,
reprinted in The Self?, G. Strawson (ed.) (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 73.
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understanding certain self-directed activity as much as those of the
more meta-variety. If so, this would presumably close the gap
between the Espisodic, Diachronic and Narrative temperaments,
which Strawson identifies.
This theme is picked up and developed by Schechtman in her
contribution. In direct response to Strawson’s worries, she sets out
to clarify and refine her original narrative self-constitution thesis.
Crucially, a useful taxonomy is provided by considering a range of
possible answers to three important questions: What counts as a life
narrative? What count as having a narrative? And, what are the
practical implications of having (or failing to have) a narrative?
Narrative views exist along a continuum precisely because any
given one might advance stronger or weaker replies to each of these
questions. Like Goldilocks (and baby bear), Schechtman prefers a
moderate response every time. Locating her own account in the
mid-range, while she denies that the construction of self-narratives
can be understood as purely sub-personal activity, it is equally not
something that need be an explicit project. So understood, ‘there is
no requirement that an identity constituting narrative have a
unifying theme, or represent a quest or have a well defined plot that
fits a distinct literary genera’.
More than this, she now identifies two distinct but inter-related
strands within her position. These speak to different questions
about personal identity that come into view when we distinguish
‘selves’ of the Strawsonian Episodic variety—i.e. psychological
entities that are the subjects of experience—from ‘persons’—whose
existence implies longer term social relations, commitments and
responsibilities. To be a person is to exist in such way as to be open
to moral and legal accountability, and for it to make sense that one
has concerns for one’s future and continued survival. Selves, by
way of contrast, are less public and less long-lasting. They are
bound up with certain actions and experiences in a strong way that
is affectively salient, thus only certain phases of our existence are
identity-conferring with respect to selfhood. Accordingly, persons
and selves are constituted by different kinds of self-narratives, in
different ways; the life of a single person may be comprised of
many distinct shorter narratives. Acknowledging this distinction
yields a more nuanced and multi-faceted version of the narrative
self-constitution view. A complete account of personal identity,
Schechtman claims, requires attending to both aspects. Not only
does this division of labour provide the basis for a more refined,
two-tiered narrative account of personal identity, she claims that it
is compatible with Strawson’s observations in a way that defuses his
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primary objections. Nevertheless, disagreements are likely to
remain—the paper concludes by considering those that are most
likely and important.
Focusing on how to best understand the correct interface
between phenomenology and hermeneutics, Dan Zahavi raises
concerns about narrative accounts of the self from a different
direction—and in a way that matters in the light of Schechtman’s
proposed refinements. After providing an extremely valuable short
review of prominent positions in the literature, he stresses limits
and potentially distorting effects of the narrative view of the self, if
it is adopted as the only way of legitimately understanding
selfhood. Specifically, he attempts to demonstrate that unqualified,
extreme narrative approaches to the self are limited in two
important respects. Fundamentally, they fail to recognize appropri-
ately the existence of a core consciousness of the sort that is
primitive and pre-reflective; one is bound up with non-discursive
ways of being in the world—i.e. the kinds of consciousness that are
associated with the having of a first person perspective, experiences
of embodied ownership and the like. Since such experiences are
phenomenologically salient, if Zahavi is right to claim that ‘it
doesn’t make sense to speak of a first-person perspective without
speaking of a self’ then it seems we have little option but to
acknowledge the existence of non-narrative selves. Relatedly, it is
complained that this failure makes it impossible for proponents of
exclusively narrative accounts of selfhood to make adequate sense
of the experience of ‘otherness’ of the sort that has been
highlighted by Sartre and Lévinas. To regard others as always
completely accessible to us by means of some narrative or other is
unfaithful to aspects of our phenomenology. Despite these
criticisms, Zahavi makes it clear however that he sees a potential
partnership between different treatments of core and narratively
extended forms of consciousness, holding out hope that phenom-
enology and hermeneutics may yet prove to be complementary.
Gallagher’s concluding contribution provides a good example of
how this might be achieved. Recognizing that narratively consti-
tuted selves are not the only selves, he concentrates on explicating
the underlying cognitive capacities that underpin our basic
narrative competency—those which make it possible to enjoy the
developmental opportunities that engaging in intersubjective,
socially framed narrative practices provide. To benefit from these
requires capacities not only for understanding narratives but also a
basic kind of narrative understanding. Focusing on the capacity to
generate coherent self-narratives, he distinguishes and discusses
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four non-negotiable pre-requisites. These comprise capacities for
temporal ordering (constituting two sub-abilities that relate, on the
one hand, to the objective ordering of events and, on the other, to
the capacity to situate past and future happenings egocentrically);
minimal self-reference; episodic and autobiographical memory; and
metacognition. Each of these capacities is discussed in its own
right, but so too are the complex dependencies and inter-
dependencies between them.
Picking up on a familiar thread, Gallagher argues that the
ultimate pay-off of exercising our narrative competencies in the
right way and in the right conditions is the development of a
narrative self. But, like Schechtman, he opts for a modest
understanding of such selves, holding that ‘The narrative self may
be more than a simple abstract point of interesting narratives, but
less than a unified product of a consistent narrative’ (Gallagher,
this volume). Indeed, he holds that narratively constituted selves
will be more or less stable and unified and that they are always at
serious risk of self-deception, confabulation and the like. This is
illustrated in his concluding discussion of the deficits in narrative
competency, as present in dysnarrativia and various forms of
schizophrenia, which serve as powerful reminders of the value and
importance of our capacity to form coherent and stable, if less than
fully unified, self-narratives.
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